

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

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G-2 Recommended Changes to 11 June Draft of NIE-32

13. (Delete and substitute new paragraph) The Korean war has resulted in the deployment of major portions of Communist China's best military forces in Korea and/or Manchuria. Supply requirements of the war are taxing heavily Communist China's limited logistic capabilities. In addition, guerrilla activity and increased unrest have required the commitment of large military forces within China for the maintenance of internal security. We estimate, therefore, that Chinese Communist capabilities for military operations in Southeast Asia or against Taiwan have decreased as a result of their participation in the Korean War.

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14. (Portions of old para 14 included in new paragraph 16, 19 and 20) The Chinese Communists had an estimated 277,000 troops deployed in Korea on 19 June 1951. In addition it is estimated that they had 11 armies and elements of 4 armies and special units in Manchuria totalling 358,000 men. These units constituted a major portion of their best forces.

15. (Second portion of old para 15) Chinese casualties in Korea are estimated to have been 569,000 as of 13 June 1951, including 71,300 non-battle casualties and 16,200 prisoners of war. Among these casualties have been an undetermined number of the better trained and

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politically more reliable troops, especially officers, and non-comm-
issioned officers who will be hard to replace. Even with a large pool of
untrained basic replacements available, it would be virtually im-
possible for any army to maintain its combat efficiency if it continued
to sustain while suffering such large casualties among key personnel.
There are indications that the units committed earlier were of a
higher caliber than those recently encountered by the United Nations
forces. Morale is lower among Chinese forces in Korea than initially
and the rate of PW capture has increased greatly.

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16. (First portion of old para 14 with additions) Despite heavy losses, the total estimated strength of the Chinese Communist Field Forces increased from 1,770,000 on 1 October 1950 to 1,947,000 on 9 June 1951. Military District units and Militia have also been strengthened. (Remainder of para 14 to paras 19 and 20)

17. (Old para 16) Losses of materiel in Korea have been considerable. Since Communist China's output of high explosives and military equipment, including artillery, is insufficient to keep up with the expenditures and losses of material in Korea and since Communist China has no motor vehicle and aircraft industries, the Korean war has tended to make the Peiping Regime increasingly dependent upon the USSR for logistic support.

18. Relatively few Soviet weapons and little equipment have been found in the hands of Chinese Communists in Korea. There are a number of fairly reliable indications, however, that tanks and heavy equipment are being supplied to Chinese Communist units in Manchuria; additional reports, probably with some basis in fact, state that the Soviets have agreed to equip and train Chinese Communist divisions. ^{but} ~~It is estimated~~ that there are 10,000 Soviet military advisers throughout China, and an ^{that} estimated 3,000 such advisers are with the Communist forces in Korea.

19. The Chinese Communist Air Force has been steadily expanded,
especially by the addition of jet fighters. ~~The USSR has provided~~

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